Governance improvement measures, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, often stress the need for more financial experts on corporate boards. Directors from the lending bank require particular attention because the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders would be most severe (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). In this paper, we examine whether commercial banker directors work in the best interests of shareholders in providing incentives to the chief executive officer (CEO). We find that the CEO's compensation VEGA is lower if an affiliated banker director is on the board, especially when the director is the chair of the compensation committee. Further, we find evidence that commercial banker directors increase debt-like compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) and make it more sensitive to performance and less sensitive to risk.
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Introduction
Boards of directors play an important role in monitoring and advising chief executive officers (CEOs) in the interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 1998; Jensen, 1993; Adams et al., 2008) . However, the boards of directors may not always act in the best interests of the shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . In fact, U.S.
non-shareholder constituency statutes (or stakeholder statutes) allow directors to consider the effects on non-shareholder stakeholders when making board decisions (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) , suggesting that directors' preferences could diverge from those of the shareholders, depending on the director's background.
Among the many different backgrounds of boards of directors, commercial banker directors (CBDs) deserve special attention due to their financial expertise and potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Booth and Deli, 1999; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Güner et al., 2008; Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012; Hilscher and SisliCiamarra, 2013) . A CBD is defined as an outside director in a non-financial firm who is also an executive of a commercial bank. The bank may or may not have loan exposure to the firm.
Because one needs to have adequate expert knowledge and an extensive professional network in financial markets to be promoted as a bank executive, a CBD is assumed to have financial expertise that benefits the company's shareholders (Booth and Deli, 1999) . However, because the CBD is employed by the commercial bank, the CBD's interests are aligned with (potential) creditors of the company. The CBD's interests could therefore diverge from the company shareholders' interests. 4 affiliated banker director (ABD) as one who works for the bank that currently has or previously (up to five years prior) had some type of loan exposure with the monitored company according to the DealScan database. When ABDs are present, we find that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm risk (VEGA) is significantly smaller. Further investigation shows that debt-like compensation is more sensitive to performance and less sensitive to risk in the presence of ABDs. We find that the negative correlation between VEGA and ABD presence is stronger if the ABD is the chair of the compensation committee. Our finding is robust after controlling for the potential selection bias of having CBDs. We also find that debt-like compensation is significantly higher when CBDs are present, which is the first time this association is reported in the literature. We also find that the industry-relative VEGA of CEO compensation significantly decreases after the appointment of CBDs. Lastly, we find that the industry-relative leverage ratio significantly increases after the departure of CBDs.
One thing to note is that the conflicts of interest hypothesis and the financial expertise hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. Although many of our results support the conflicts of interest hypothesis, we still find results that support the financial expertise hypothesis. The positive result of our stock market event study on CBD appointment and departure suggests the possibility that outside investors recognize and appreciate the human capital and financial expertise of CBDs. Specifically, for firms that did not previously have any CBDs, investor response to CBD appointment is positive and significant if the prior risk level is high. In addition, when a CBD is dismissed without a replacement CBD on the board, the stock market investors' response is negative, especially when prior performance was good and prior financial risk was high. These results imply that a CBD has a positive effect on firm value by providing financial expertise.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection and methodology. Section 3 reports the results and discusses the endogeneity concern. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Data and methodology
Sample
To identify banker directors of U.S. public firms, we use BoardEx (Management Diagnostics Limited) data that contains information about more than 300,000 unique board members of publicly listed companies in the United States and elsewhere. To obtain information on whether a director works (or has worked) for a commercial bank, we use text matching algorithms on the names of all the banks in the Bank Regulatory Database and the Commercial Bank and Bank Holding Company Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. We also use the bank names as shown in the LPC DealScan database for banks with positive loan amounts. Additionally, we use the names of the firms in Compustat whose Fama-French 49-industry group identifies them as commercial banks. Last, we manually check the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) website to determine whether the identified bank is a bank holding company. To ensure that our classification of banks as investment or commercial banks is accurate, especially after the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act, we use the IPO Underwriter Reputation Rankings chart of Jay Ritter (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) 3 to identify investment banks.
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The CEO compensation data are from ExecuComp, which provides the executive compensation data of Standard & Poor's (S&P) 
Sample distribution and summary statistics
The sample distribution by year and by industry is shown in Table 1 . We use 6,945 firmyears in our compensation regressions. We also display the number of firms in which at least one CBD is present (left) and at least one ABD is present (right) in the square bracket of each cell.
We use the Global Industry Classification Standard code (GICS) code developed by MSCI and S&P to display the breakdown of firm-years by industry. Since financial institutions are heavily regulated by the government, making standard governance mechanisms less applicable, 5 we exclude financial institutions based on this GICS code. Interestingly, no firm in the information technology sector appears to have an ABD, which supports the previous findings in the literature that bankers sit on less risky firms (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001) . In terms of a time trend, the number of firms with CBDs peaked in 2003 and has been decreasing since, consistent with prior literature (Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012; Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013) . The time trend is attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's emphasis on reducing conflicts of interest on corporate boards (Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013 ).
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 7 Table 2 shows the summary statistics of our sample. Approximately 7.3% of all firmyears in our sample have at least one CBD, 1.4% have at least one ABD, and the remaining 5.9%
have only non-ABDs (NABDs).
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The proportion of firms with CBDs is lower than that reported in the literature (31.6% for Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; 27% for Güner et al., 2008; 22-27% for Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012; and 29.7% for Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013) . We believe the difference is attributable to two facts. First, our sample is from a larger pool that includes smaller firms (1,500 large publicly traded firms in the United States). Prior literature focuses on S&P 500 firms (Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013) and Forbes 500 firms (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Güner et al., 2008) . As Kroszner and Strahan (2001) point out, bankers are more likely to sit on the boards of more stable firms, which are presumably larger. Second, our classification of commercial banker as opposed to investment banker could have been more restrictive than in previous research. Sisli-Ciamarra (2012) reports that the proportion of firm-years that have at least one investment banker was less than 10% throughout the sample period and Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra (2013) report 10.1%. We find that 13.8% of firm-years have at least one investment banker on the board. Some of the commercial banks in our DealScan data that are the lead managers of syndicated loans are actually investment banks based on the IPO Underwriter Reputation Rankings chart, even though they are found in the FDIC BankFind database. The increased ambiguity between CBDs and investment banker directors (IBDs) is attributable to the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act. Thus, whenever the name of the bank is found in the IPO ranking chart, we classify it as an investment bank even if DealScan lists it as the lead manager of a syndication loan. Therefore, our more restrictive classification rule could bias against finding our results. Moreover, we control for the presence of IBDs in every regression.
Empirical method and results
PPS and the CEO compensation VEGA
Since our key hypothesis tests whether CEO compensation is sensitive to firm performance and risk depending on the presence of a CBD, we investigate the PPS and VEGA of CEO compensation, where PPS is constructed following Core and Guay (2002) 7 and VEGA
following Coles et al. (2006) . If the CBD's financial expertise manifests itself, CEO compensation would be more sensitive to company performance and PPS would be higher for firms with CBDs.
If the CBD's conflicts of interest are influential, CEO compensation would be less sensitive to the risk of the firm or even negatively correlated with it. Thus, the VEGA of CEO compensation would be lower when CBDs are present. Our empirical specification is as follows:
where 1{CBD}, 1{ABD}, and 1{NABD} are dummy variables that equal one if the firm has at least one CBD, ABD, or NABD on its board, respectively and zero otherwise. Our performance 7 In untabulated analyses, we also measure PPS following Yermack (1995) and find consistent results.
measure is ROA, which is calculated as annual operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Accounting information, which aggregates performance over time, is sufficient for optimal compensation analysis (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) . Our risk measure is the trailing five-year standard deviation of quarterly ROAs. Our controls, based on the CEO compensation literature (Murphy, 1999 (Murphy, , 2011 Frydman and Saks, 2010; Benmelech and Frydman, 2012; Deng and Gao, 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Humphrey-Jenner et al., 2015) , are as follows: (1) one-year stock performance over the fiscal year, (2) firm size (natural log of total assets), (3) the marketto-book ratio, (4) the leverage ratio, (5) the cash amount relative to total assets, (6) research and development (R&D) expenditure relative to total assets as a measure of information asymmetry, (7) capital expenditure relative to total assets, (8) the natural log of firm age, (9) a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is of retirement age, (10) CEO tenure, (11) the percentage of independent directors on the board, (12) a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one IBD, and (13) industry and year fixed effects.
Our key predictions are as follows. The financial expertise hypothesis predicts that 0 for equations (1) and (3). The conflicts of interest hypothesis predicts that 0 for equations (2) and (4). Since PPS and VEGA are determined simultaneously, we should use the simultaneous equation model (SEM) for equations (1) and (2) and equations (3) and (4), respectively. However, because the right-hand-side variables are the same, the SEM is not identified, so we estimate equations (1) and (2) and equations (3) and (4), respectively, instead, using seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) (Wooldridge, 2002) . Our estimation results are shown in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 about here]
10
In the first set of regressions in Table 3 , we find no significant coefficients for 1{CBD}.
However, in the second set of regressions, we find a negative and significant coefficient of 1{ABD} in the VEGA regression with a p-value of 5.3%. This supports our hypothesis of conflicts of interest that ABD provides risk-reducing incentives for the CEO, on average.
Starting with a median VEGA of $81,866, having an ABD translates into a reduction in VEGA of $15,507. We also find that the PPS and VEGA are significantly higher when IBDs are present as independent directors. To the extent that directors with financial expertise are controlled for, our results show that the percentage of independent directors is negatively associated with PPS.
The result suggests that the most important governance effect of independent directors on CEO compensation comes from directors with financial expertise, proxied by IBD presence in our specification. The convexity of compensation is positively associated with the market-to-book ratio and the R&D investment of the firm and negatively associated with CEO age. In addition, it is negatively associated with the firm's financial leverage and capital expenditure.
Debt-like compensation and CBDs
One way CBDs could incentivize CEO to behave more like creditors is to provide more debt-like compensation (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007) . More specifically, pension and deferred compensation are liabilities to the CEO's company, which make the CEO more like the company's creditor because the CEO has been promised to be paid in the future. Therefore, in this section, we hypothesize that when CBDs are present, the amount of CEO debt-like compensation increases. Following Sundaram and Yermack (2007) , our empirical model is as follows:
Inside debt is the sum of pension and deferred compensation. Our controls are as follows:
(1) CEO tenure, (2) a dummy variable that equals one if the CEO is an outsider, (3) firm size, (4) leverage ratio, (5) a dummy variable that equals one if operating income is negative, (6) R&D relative to sales, (7) a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a tax loss carryforward, Outsider CEOs receive a smaller pension than insiders do. The CEOs of larger firms receive greater pension compensation than the CEOs of smaller firms.
Given that CBDs are associated with more debt-like compensation overall, we investigate whether CBDs also influence debt-like compensation as a way to increase firm performance and/or to reduce firm risk. We propose the following empirical model:
In equation (7), our prediction is that 0 under the financial expertise hypothesis and 0 under the conflict of interest hypothesis. In equation (8), our prediction is that , 0 under the financial expertise hypothesis and 0 under the conflict of interest hypothesis. We do not take positions regarding . The results are shown in Panel C of Table 4 and it confirms our prediction of conflicts of interest as well as financial expertise. In the first regression, the coefficient of the interaction between ROA and 1{CBD} is positive and significant at the 1% level, which suggests that CBDs increase debt-like compensation when firm performance is good and vice versa. In addition, we find that the coefficient of the interaction between risk and 1{CBD} is negative with marginal statistical significance. This finding supports our hypothesis 13 that CBDs incentivize the CEO to reduce risk through debt-like compensation when the risk of the firm is high. In the second through fourth regressions, both the coefficients of the interactions between 1{ABD} and ROA and between 1{NABD} and ROA are positive and significant, supporting the evidence that both types of CBDs increase debt-like compensation in accordance with firm performance. We also find that the coefficient of interaction between 1{ABD} and firm risk, proxied by , is negative and significant at less than the 1% level. This result again indicates the conflicts of interest from ABDs. We do not find an equivalent negative and significant coefficient for the interaction between 1{NABD} and firm risk. Note that the influence of banker directors upon CEO incentives is statistically more significant for debt-like compensation than for non-debt-like compensation. In addition, only the coefficient of the interaction between 1{ABD} and is significant, whereas the coefficient of the interaction between 1{NABD} and is insignificant. This contrast suggests that the conflicts of interest are disproportionately stronger for ABDs than for NABDs.
The sign of the ABD dummy is counterintuitive. We believe that it is attributable to a high correlation with the interaction terms (the piecewise correlation with ROA*1{ABD} is 0.8984 and that with ROA volatility*1{ABD} is 0.721). In addition, some of the coefficients have an extremely large magnitude, which we believe results from the very small proportion of ABDs and NABDs in our sample .
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Stock market event study of CBD appointments
To determine whether shareholders perceive that CBDs add value, we run a stock market event study of CBD appointments and departures. If CBD's financial expertise is recognized by equity investors, the stock market would respond positively when a commercial banker is appointed an outside director of the firm. Equivalently, the price response would be negative when the CBD departs. On the other hand, if CBDs are perceived as a source of conflicts of interest, the stock market response to the appointment (departure) of CBDs would be negative (positive).
The BoardEx database provides the dates of the first announcements of the appointments and departures of directors. We identify 50 (19) announcements of banker directors' appointments (departures) that are not contaminated within [+1, -1] relative trading days by major corporate events, such as earnings announcements, M&A announcements, joint venture announcements, class action lawsuits, and restatements (Masulis et al., 2012) . We classify appointment announcements into three different subgroups by manually reading the DEF14-A documents in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's EDGAR system. 8 The first subgroup is formed of cases in which a CBD is appointed to a company that did not have any CBDs the year before (N = 70). The second subgroup represents cases in which a CBD is appointed to a company that had at least one CBD the year before (N = 8). The reason for using these two groups is that the financial expertise or conflicts of interest associated with the appointed CBD would be more salient if the CBD was not preceded by any CBDs. Our last subsample contains cases that we could not classify into any of the two aforementioned groups due to lack of data in the electronic system (N = 12).
Similarly, we classify the departure events into three different subgroups. In the departure setting, financial expertise or conflicts of interest associated with the departing CBDs would be more salient if the CBD is not succeeded by a CBD. The first subgroup represents cases in which the firm has no CBDs after a CBD departure (N = 10). The second subgroup represents cases in which there is at least one CBD in the firm after a CBD's departure (N = 8). The last group contains cases that we could not classify into any of the two aforementioned groups due to lack of data in the electronic system (N = 1).
[Insert Table 5 Table 5 . We find equity investors do not favor the appointment of CBDs when the company previously had CBDs (economic magnitude of -0.39% to -0.29%, t-stat 1.78 to 2.37). We believe this evidence is supportive of the conflicts of interest hypothesis, and the next section adds clarification through regression analysis. In Panel B, we find that the stock market response is negative and significant when there are no more CBDs on the board after the CBDs' departure (economic magnitude of -0.93% to -0.75%, t-stat 2.46 to 2.87). This may suggest that the stock market perceives that the departure of the CBD without a replacement CBD as a loss of a financial expert. However, this is a preliminary result and we will use multiple regressions of Table 6 , to understand the price response more precisely.
Using CAR[0] based on the equal-weighted CRSP market index based on the CAPM, we run multiple regressions in Table 6 . For the sample of CBD appointments (see Panel A in Table   6 ), we first run the regression for the whole sample (column (1)) and then run the regression for the sample in which there was no CBD before the appointment (column (2)). Last, we run the regression for the remaining observations (column (3)). Likewise, for the sample of CBD departures (see Panel B in Table 6 ), we first run the regression for the whole sample (column (1)), the regression for the sample in which there was no CBD after the departure (column (2)), and finally the regression for the rest of the observations (column (3)). Since CBD's financial expertise could manifest itself in the form of risk management, financial performance improvement, or debt capital management, we use the following regression model:
Panel A of Table 6 shows that a CBD appointment is especially welcome for firms with high idiosyncratic risk that did not previously have a CBD. This result could suggest that stock market investors perceive CBDs to be experts in risk management. Alternatively, it may be that firms with high idiosyncratic volatility have large magnitude abnormal returns in the first place because CAR[0] is the residual of the daily return net of expected return. Still, the coefficient's positive sign suggests that market perception is positive for the CBD when firm-specific risk is high. For the subsample of firms that previously had CBDs, a new CBD appointment is perceived as adding value when the firm's prior performance was poor and cash flow was 17 negative. These results also support the financial expertise hypothesis. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the departure of CBDs is perceived as negative when prior stock performance or cash flow was good or when the prior leverage ratio was high. These results may imply that the CBD's financial expertise or human capital was valued highly by investors for companies that were performing well, had sufficient cash flow, or had a high leverage ratio. Consequently, such highly valued CBDs' departure announcement without any replacing CBDs provokes a negative stock market response, supporting the financial expertise hypothesis.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Change of VEGA and leverage before and after CBD appointment/departure
In the previous section, we find interesting responses of stock market investors around the time of a CBD's appointment and departure. Financial leverage is a key driver of firm financial risk (Hamada, 1972) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) find that a firm's leverage ratios are significantly affected by the CEO's incentives. Therefore, we look at changes in the firm's leverage ratio and the change in VEGA of the CEO's compensation around the CBD's appointment and departure time. For each leverage ratio and VEGA of CEO compensation, we compute the industry-relative variables by subtracting the industry median based on the two-digit SIC code. Then, with the final sample used in the stock market event study from the previous section, we compute the average industry-relative leverage ratio and that of VEGA as of the fiscal year-end before and after the CBD's appointment (departure) announcements, respectively.
We focus on CBD appointments (departures) for firms that did not have any CBDs before (after) the appointment (departures).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
18
[Insert Figure 1&2 about here]
Panel A of Table 7 shows that the industry-relative leverage ratio increases by 3.27%
after the departure of CBDs. The result is statistically significant at the 8.5% level. On the other hand, we find that the industry-relative leverage ratio decreases surrounding the appointment of Panel B of Table 7 shows that the CEO compensation VEGA decreases significantly, by $38.86, for each percentage change in volatility (p-value = 0.0945), which suggests that CBDs, once appointed, influence the CEO compensation structure so that the compensation's sensitivity to volatility decreases significantly. We also find that the industry-relative VEGA increases after the departure of CBDs (p-value = 0.15). Again, we compare the difference between the changes of VEGA surrounding CBDs appointments and departures and find a statistically significant difference (p-value = 0.0378). Panel B of Figure 1 shows our results graphically.
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Overall, we find that CBDs, once appointed, influence to reduce the company's financial risk. In addition, the company's leverage ratio and CEO pay-risk sensitivity (VEGA) rises after the CBDs leave. These results provide evidence consistent with the conflicts of interest hypothesis.
Endogeneity concern and selection bias
Since the assignment of CBDs is not random, endogeneity is a valid concern (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2008) . More specifically, it is possible that a board of directors that is focused on reducing the financial risk of the firm could be systematically hiring commercial bankers as outside directors. To the extent that the concern arises from omitted timeinvariant or time-specific variables, we control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects for all our regressions. If the source of bias is measurement error, we run regressions using the percentage of CBDs (and the percentages of ABDs and NABDs, similarly) and find similar results.
Our most serious concern is the self-selection of commercial bankers to sit on the boards of non-financial companies due to their legal risk of equitable subordination and lender liability.
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) find that bankers sit on the boards of companies with a medium risk level to avoid bankruptcy. In addition, the authors find that bankers sit on the boards of companies with a large size and low information asymmetry, a high leverage ratio, and a low short-term to long-term debt ratio.
We control for selection bias using Heckman's (1979) selection model. Specifically, we first run a probit regression for predicting CBDs on the board using firm characteristics. Then we obtain the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) for the probit model. Last, we use the IMR in the secondstage regressions to control for selection bias.
For the first-stage selection regression, we borrow from the literature (Booth and Deli, 1999; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005; Santos and Rumble, 2006; SisliCiamarra, 2012; Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013) and use the following determinants of the 20 presence of CBDs: (1) the short-term debt to long-term debt ratio, (2) firm size, (3) the leverage ratio, (4) cash to total assets, (5) stock return volatility, (6) the market to book, (7) R&D expense divided by total assets, (8) the default probability measured by KMV's Expected Default Frequency (EDF),
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(9) the S&P credit rating, (10) a dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have a credit rating and zero otherwise, (11) the ratio of insiders on the board, and (12) board size. All the explanatory variables in the first-stage equation are averaged over the previous three years because the board composition is typically staggered and changes slowly over time. Here we argue that the short-term debt to long-term debt ratio works as an instrumental variable. Even though it is correlated with the assignment of CBDs, it is not related to CEO incentives, based on the findings of Chava and Purnanandam (2010) . These authors find that the debt maturity structure is not correlated with a CEO compensation contract.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Panel A of Table 8 shows the result of the first-stage probit regression. We find that the probability of having a CBD is negatively correlated with the short-term debt to long-term debt ratio, which reaffirms that bankers are more likely to sit on the board of a company that is less likely to suffer from a short-term debt burden. We also find that the likelihood of having a CBD is positively correlated with firm size and board size. The results are largely consistent with the literature.
In Panel B of Table 8 , we run the second-stage regression based on the SUR of the PPS and VEGA in Table 3 . The results are consistent, in that VEGA is reduced when an ABD is present in the year before. We find that controlling for selection bias improves the statistical significance of the coefficient from 5.3% to 4.4%. In Panel C, we run the second-stage regression of debt-like compensation as in Table 4 . The previous results are robust.
Compensation committee membership of the CBD
What is the empirical channel through which CBD influence affects CEO compensation?
In this section, we examine the compensation committee of the board because it is the organizational body that designs the CEO's compensation contracts. We hypothesize that the effect of a CBD on the convexity of CEO compensation would be stronger when the CBD is on the committee or when the CBD is the committee chair. For most of the firm-years in our sample, BoardEx classifies board members by committee membership for any given fiscal year.
Furthermore, it provides information about whether the director is the chair of the committee.
Based on the compensation committee information subset, we find that 6.54% of firm-years have at least one CBD (Panel A of Table 9 ). However, not all CBDs are on the compensation committee. In our committee subsample, CBDs are not on the compensation committee for 3.09% of firm-years (about half of the time with CBDs). We find that for 2.43% of firm-years, all the CBDs are involved as compensation committee non-chair members. For 1.03% of firm-years, we find that one of the CBDs is the chair of the compensation committee. Therefore, we modify the set of explanatory variables in our original empirical model (1) and (2) as follows:
where 1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the CBDs in the firm are involved in the compensation committee only as members, 1 is a dummy variable that equals one if any of the CBDs in the firm works as the chair of the compensation committee, and. 1 is a dummy variable that equals one if none of the CBDs in the firm are on the compensation committee. In the second set of equations, we run equivalent regressions by constructing dummy variables for ABDs and NABDs being a member or the chair of the compensation committee, respectively. Control variables include the IMR from Table 8 , Panel A, and the same controls used in Table 3 or Table 8 , Panel B. Likewise, in Table 3 or   Table 8 , Panel B, the regression model (10) is analyzed under the SUR framework.
The result in Panel B of Table 9 shows that ABDs reduce the VEGA of CEO compensation significantly with a p-value of near zero when the CBD is the chair of the compensation committee. The coefficient is -1.283, which suggests that nearly three-quarters of the VEGA value ($59,195) disappears when the ABD serves as the chair of the compensation committee. Instead, we find that PPS significantly increases from the median PPS of $591,983 by $716,309 when an ABD serves as the chair of compensation committee, which shows a tradeoff between the conflicts of interest and financial expertise hypotheses.
Lastly, we also replicate Panel C of Table 4 to check the impact of CBDs on CEOs' debtlike compensation when CBDs are a member of the compensation committee:
The control variables include the IMR from Table 8 , Panel A, and the same controls are used as in Table 4 , Panel C. Our prediction based on the financial expertise hypothesis is that , 0. In addition, our prediction based on the conflicts of interest hypothesis is that , 0.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
We find that the CBDs make debt-like compensation more sensitive to firm performance if they are members of the compensation committee. However, we also find that CBDs serving as a member of the compensation committee are negatively associated with inside debt, while
CBDs not serving as a member are positively associated with inside debt. Moreover, the negative correlation between risk and inside debt is more pronounced when the CBD is not a member of the compensation committee. Because of this slightly puzzling result, we further investigate by splitting the CBD dummies into ABD dummies and NABD dummies and by interacting both sets of dummies with performance and risk, respectively.
In the second column of Panel C of Table 9 , we find that ABDs make debt-like compensation more sensitive to firm performance and less sensitive to firm risk. We also find such an increase in performance sensitivity and a decrease in risk sensitivity when ABDs are not members of the compensation committee. However, the economic magnitude is about three to four times greater when ABDs are committee members than when they are not. We hardly find any significant results of equivalent economic magnitude for the set of variables using the NABD dummies. Our results in this section strongly support the conflicts of interest hypothesis, but they also supports the financial expertise hypothesis. 
Summary and Conclusion
There has been an ongoing debate about whether having a banker director would induce conflicts of interest or provide financial expertise by looking at various financial policies: for example, capital structure (Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012), M&As (Hilscher and Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013), and investments (Güner et al., 2008) . Given that CEOs, who are subject to economic incentives, make key financial decisions, our contribution to the literature is significant. We empirically find that CEO incentives are significantly affected by CBDs' conflicts of interest, particularly if they are affiliated. Specifically, when ABDs are member of the compensation committee or its chair, they seem to reduce the convexity of CEO compensation (VEGA). Moreover, the influence of CBDs upon CEO incentives seems to manifest itself through debt-like compensation as well. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to document the impact of CBDs on debt-like compensation as increasing sensitivity to performance and decreasing sensitivity to risk.
We recognize the limitations of our study as well. The number of cases in which CBDs are present is clearly declining in the United States due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which encourages firms to avoid conflicts of interest arising from the monitoring board of directors.
Still, our finding has important implications for the international audience because CBDs are much more prevalent in bank-based economic systems, such as Europe and Japan (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Levine, 2002) . Lastly, it should be noted again that both the conflicts of interest hypothesis and the financial expertise hypothesis are not mutually exclusive but, rather, simultaneously supported in our study. In the future, it would be interesting to study the effects of CBDs upon other kinds of risk, such as stock price crash risk (Kim et al., 2011) , because of the risk-reducing influence of the directors. (2006) . Industries are defined using two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. The p-values, based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, are given every second line of each row. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel B: Regression results
An ordinary least squares regression is used. The dependent variable is the sum of the pension value and deferred compensation in the ExecuComp data, divided by 1000. Industries are defined using two-digit SIC codes. The independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The p-values are given every second line of each row. The variables are defined in Appendix A. An ordinary least squares regression is used. The dependent variable is the sum of the pension value and deferred compensation in the ExecuComp data, divided by 1000. Industries are defined using two-digit SIC codes. the independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The p-values, based on robust standard errors, are given every second line of each row. The variables are defined in Appendix A. Table 6 .
CAR regressions
The dependent variable is the abnormal return on the day of the announcement (CAR[0]), based on the CAPM, using the EW market index of the CRSP. The result is robust when we use a VW index return or the S&P 500 index return, or when we use a market model using the S&P 500 index return, the Fama-French three-factor model, or the Carhart four-factor model. The estimation window is [-280, -31] trading days before the event. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The p-values, based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, are given every second line of each row. The variables are defined in Appendix A. For all the panels, industry is defined using two-digit SIC codes. The independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The variables are defined in Appendix A. Table 9 . Compensation committee membership/chair position of CBDs
The PPS is measured following Core and Guay (2002) and VEGA is measured following Coles et al. (2006) . Industries are defined using two-digit SIC codes. The independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The p-values, based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, are given every second line. The control variables are defined in Appendix A.
Panel A: Compensation committee involvement (in the regression subsample)
CBD is the chair of compensation committee 1.03% CBD is only a member of compensation committee 2.43% CBD is not in compensation committee 3.09% Total firm-years that has CBDs in the regressions below 6.54% Dummy variable that is one if the operating income of the company is negative in the fiscal year. 1{Outsider CEO} Dummy variable that is one if the CEO was an outsider when appointed. We follow Parrino (1997) in defining outsiders: A CEO is an outsider if that person was not employed by the same company one year before the announcement of the CEO appointment. 1{Tax Loss Carry Forward} Dummy variable that is one if the company had negative income before taxes up to three years before the fiscal year. 1year stock perf.
Annualized monthly stock returns. Board size Number of board members of the company. CAPEX/total assets Capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by total assets (AT), winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Cash flow Net income plus depreciation divided by lagged property, plant, and equipment. Cash/total assets Cash divided by total assets at the end of the fiscal year.
CEO tenure Number of years the person has been in the position of CEO at the same company. If missing, we manually collected the information using Google, Forbes, and Factiva. credit rating
Credit rating by S&P, transformed into numbers, with a better credit quality associated with a higher number. We assign 22 to a AAA rating and zero to a CCC rating. Firm Age Firm age is measured as the number of years since the company's data were available in Compustat.
Idiosyncratic risk
Idiosyncratic risk is the root mean squared error of the market model using monthly S&P 500 index returns over the past three years. Total interest-bearing debt divided by total assets, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ln(firm age) Natural log of firm age. M/B Market value of equity (PRCC_F*CSHO) divided by the book value of equity (CEQ), winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. PPS CEO's pay-performance sensitivity, measured following Core and Guay (2002) . It measures the dollar value change of a CEO's total compensation when the stock return of the company changes by one percentage point. R&D/Sales R&D expense (XRD) divided by total sales (REVT), winsorized at 1% and 99% level. R&D/total assets R&D expense (XRD) divided by total assets (AT), winsorized at 1% and 99% level.
Ratio of insiders'
The proportion of insiders out of the total number of board members. ROA Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, from annual Compustat data, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. ROA volatility Standard deviation of past 5 years of quarterly return on assets, where return on assets is calculated as oibdpq/atq from the fundq table of Compustat data, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Size: ln(total assets) Natural log of total assets, where total assets is the AT variable in the Compustat data . STDebt/LTDebt Short-term debt divided by long-term debt. Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year. VEGA CEO's pay-risk sensitivity measured following Coles et al. (2006) . It measures the dollar value change of a CEO's total compensation when the volatility of the stock return changes by one percentage point.
